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TOWARDS A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE MARK LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Robert Burrell* and Kimberlee Weatherall** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
TｴW デWﾏヮデ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ WﾐデｷデﾉW デｴｷゲ ;ヴデｷIﾉW デｴW けPゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ PヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ﾗa Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ L;┘┞Wヴゲげ ┘;ゲが 
in the end, capable of being resisted. This weak pun does, however, get at something 
important. On paper there ought to be a close relationship between law and (cognitive) 
psychology. Trade mark law turns on how consumers are likely to respond to signs used on or 
in relation to goods and services. Its ultimate concern, moreover, is with ensuring that traders 
do not (deliberately or otherwise) trigger particular mental states among consumers. 
Psychology can provide insights into how consumers are likely to respond to things they see 
and hear, can help us finesse what we mean by the mental states that trigger legal 
ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ ふけI;┌ゲWS デﾗ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴげが けIﾗﾐa┌ゲWSげが けSWIWｷ┗WSげが けｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデWSげぶ ;ﾐS デWﾉﾉ ┌ゲ ┘ｴWﾐ 
one of these mental states is most likely to arise. In practice, however, insights from 
psychology have had little impact on the development of trade mark law. Understanding of 
the potential relationship between the disciplines has been hampered by the fact that this 
question has too often been viewed through the narrow prism of the probative value that 
should be given to survey evidence offered by a party to legal proceedings in an attempt to 
either prove or disprove a likelihood of confusion.1 
 In this article we suggest that insights from psychology can play an important role in 
trade mark law. Articulating this role, however, needs to be handled with care and we need 
first to understand why trade mark law and psychology make uneasy bedfellows, despite their 
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apparently strong overlapping fields of interest. Our argument is broken down into three 
parts. We argue that one problem is that the language and modes of reasoning employed by 
those versed in trade mark law can obfuscate what the law is seeking to achieve.2 For 
W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが デｴW け;┗Wヴ;ｪWげ ﾗヴ けﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞げ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ﾗa デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ﾉ;┘ ｷs a legal construct framed 
with a number of policy goals in mind.3 Crucially, these goals include preserving competitive 
markets and there are times when preserving competition may require us to tolerate a degree 
of confusion. Even within trade mark circles there is a strong case that we would do well to 
be more honest about when we are prepared to tolerate a degree of confusion in order to 
achieve some other desirable end.4 But we should certainly be unsurprised when outsiders 
who interact with the trade mark system are led astray into believing that the ordinary 
consumer is, in fact, an ordinary consumer. Still more fundamentally, it needs to be 
remembered that the registered trade mark system is constructed around a legal abstraction. 
The protected res of registered trade mark law is not the sign that appears on a product, but 
rather the sign that appears on the trade marks register. This, too, can be difficult for 
outsiders to grasp, and means that registered trade mark law and confusion sit in an uneasy 
relationship to one another.5 This in turn forces courts to walk a fine line between respecting 
the principle that the scope of trade mark rights is determined by their bureaucratic form and 
taking the likelihood of confusion seriously, so as to keep trade mark rights anchored to their 
principal justification. Working out where the insights that psychology can offer fit into this 
picture is surprisingly complex.  
Something similar can be said about the extension of trade mark rights to protect 
against non-confusion based harms, harms that are usually grouped under the rubric of 
けSｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐげく TｴW W┝ｷゲデWﾐIW ;ﾐS ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴWゲW ｴ;ヴﾏゲ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗Wヴゲｷ;ﾉが H┌デ ;ﾉﾉ SWヮWﾐS ﾗﾐ 
consumers drawing a mental association between the sign used by the defendant and some 
similar sign used by the claimant. The difficulty that courts and scholars have encountered in 
trying to demarcate a workable concept of dilution ought to strengthen the case for drawing 
insights from cognitive psychology and, indeed, other disciplines. The problem, however, is 
                                                          
2 For a discussion of this issue in the context of expert and empirical evidence in trade mark cases, see K. 
WW;デｴWヴ;ﾉﾉが けTｴW Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ;ゲ デｴW EﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ MW;ゲ┌ヴW ﾗa Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ふヲヰヱΑぶ Βヰ ML‘ ヵΑく 
3 Gく Dｷﾐ┘ﾗﾗSｷW ;ﾐS Dく G;ﾐｪﾃWWが けTｴW Iﾏ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ｷﾐ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ｷﾐ Dく LWI┣┞ﾆｷW┘ｷI┣ 
and S. Weatherill (eds), The Image(s) of the Consumer in EU Law (Hart 2015). 
4 IHｷSく “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ ‘く B┌ヴヴWﾉﾉが けTヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ B┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;IｷWゲげ ｷﾐ Gく Dｷﾐ┘ﾗﾗSｷW ;ﾐS Mく J;ﾐｷゲ ふWSゲくぶが Trademark Law and 
Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 2008). 
5 Weatherall, supra n 2, 74-78; Dinwoodie and Gangjee, supra n 3.  
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that the harms that dilution is said to guard against may not map very well onto consumer 
decision-making processes at all. Courts may be reluctant to turn to external sources when 
faced with having to make sense of legislative provisions that may not be underpinned by any 
empirically defensible theory (or model) of harm. Specifically, courts may be wary of drawing 
on external sources that might point the law in a direction that is either unworkable (insofar 
as such sources demonstrate that the associative links that dilution guards against cannot be 
shown to cause brand owners harm) or undesirable (insofar as they demonstrate that 
consumers do commonly draw the associations that dilution is concerned to prevent, even if 
a likelihood of harm cannot be established).   
In the second part of the article we turn to consider the reception of insights from 
psychology into trade mark law. As we have already noted, this issue has been dominated by 
the question of how consumer survey evidence ought to be treated in proceedings in which 
infringement of a registered trade mark and / or passing off has been alleged. Indeed, this 
question has so dictated the terms of the debate that anyone who calls for greater 
engagement between the disciplines is often assumed to be arguing that consumer surveys 
must be given greater weight by the judiciary. In contrast, we take the view that courts are 
right to be sceptical of survey evidence and that many of the reasons for such evidence being 
dismissed are compelling.6 But we do suggest that we ought not to shy away from confronting 
the understandable, but in our view ultimately misplaced, degree of mistrust that can arise 
when those who are legally qualified are asked to accept insights from a discipline that may 
appear to rest on different metaphysical foundations.   
In the final substantive section of the article we make the case for greater use of 
insights from psychology. In particular, we argue that an important first step is to move away 
from the idea that insights from psychology are useful only as a means of determining 
whether consumers are likely to be confused in a real-world scenario that has led to litigation. 
We suggest that a more fruitful first step is to use psychology at a higher level of abstraction, 
that is, to test assumptions trade mark law makes about how consumers process information. 
One advantage of this approach is that it demonstrates that psychology can inform trade mark 
law, without disrupting the nature of the registration system に and perhaps even helping 
improve that system. Although we develop our argument in the first two sections primarily 
                                                          
6 This is not, however, to suggest that there are not circumstances in which carefully designed surveys or 
experiments might not have a useful role to play. For elaboration of this argument see K. Weatherall, supra n 2.      
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by reference to infringement of registered marks, in this third section of the article we cycle 
back to issues of distinctiveness and passing off.   
 
II. EXTRAORDINARY CONSUMERS AND THE NATURE OF TRADE MARK RIGHTS  
When thinking about the challenges of incorporating insights from psychology into the 
registered trade mark system, we might start with the way in which consumers are 
conceptualised within this system. Trade mark scholars have been arguing for some time that 
┘W ﾐWWS デﾗ ヮ;┞ ﾏﾗヴW ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ﾉ;┘げゲ ｷﾏ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴく7 Trade mark 
systems almost invariably resort to assessing whether infringement has occurred by asking 
whether a hypothetical consumer would be confused. Different language is used to capture 
the features of this legal construct. Thus we find references to the average consumer of 
European trade mark law, the reasonably prudent consumer of US law and the ordinary 
purchaser of Australian law. Needless to say, these terms are not necessarily coterminous. 
Moreover, even within jurisdictions, we find that courts often employ synonyms that may 
bring differences of emphasis.8 For present purposes, however, the key thing to note is that 
デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWデｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ｷゲ ｷﾐ┗;ヴｷ;Hﾉ┞ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌IデWS ┘ｷデｴ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｪﾗ;ﾉゲ ｷﾐ ﾏｷﾐSく Tﾗ Sヴ;┘ 
on a dichotomy set up by Graeme Dinwoodie, our hypothetical consumer is invariably a 
normative construct and not merely an empirical construct.9  
 There is nothing objectionable about giving normative concerns a central place in 
trade mark law. On the contrary, insofar as trade mark law is explained in terms of the need 
to reduce consumer search costs or to avoid consumer confusion we are invariably concerned 
with normative goals. Moreover, there is no reason to prioritise these particular goals above 
all others. There is nothing inherently objectionable about deciding that we might want to 
tolerate some degree of confusion / higher consumer search costs in order to maintain 
healthy levels of competition, to preserve freedom of expression or to further some other 
goal of public policy. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that it would be strange for 
                                                          
7 “WWが Wくｪくが Jく D;┗ｷゲが けLﾗI;デｷﾐｪ デｴW A┗Wヴ;ｪW Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴぎ Hｷゲ J┌SｷIｷ;ﾉ Oヴｷｪｷﾐゲが IﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ Iﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWゲ ;ﾐS C┌ヴヴWﾐデ ‘ﾗﾉW 
ｷﾐ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ぷヲヰヰヵへ IPQ ヱΒンき Lく HW┞ﾏ;ﾐﾐが けTｴW ‘W;ゲﾗﾐ;HﾉW PWヴゲﾗﾐ ｷﾐ Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ふヲヰヰ8) 
52 St Louis University Law Journal ΑΒき Jく D;┗ｷゲが け‘W┗ｷゲｷデｷﾐｪ デｴW A┗Wヴ;ｪW Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴぎ Aﾐ UﾐIWヴデ;ｷﾐ PヴWゲWﾐIW ｷﾐ Tヴ;SW 
M;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ぷヲヰヱヵへ IPQ ヱヵき Dｷﾐ┘ﾗﾗSｷW ;ﾐS G;ﾐｪﾃWWが supra ﾐ ンく けく  
8 See, e.g., in the EU Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2010] ECR I-2417, [84] 
ふECJぶぎ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヴW;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWS ;ﾐS ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;Hﾉ┞ ;デデWﾐデｷ┗W ｷﾐデWヴﾐWデ ┌ゲWヴゲげく  
9 Gく Dｷﾐ┘ﾗﾗSｷWが けTヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ;ﾐS TWヴヴｷデﾗヴ┞ぎ DWデ;Iｴｷﾐｪ Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ L;┘ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW N;デｷﾗﾐ-“デ;デWげ ふヲヰヰヴぶ ヴヱ Houston 
Law Review 885, 962; Dinwoodie and Gangjee, supra n 3, 345-346.  
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courts to focus exclusively on the response of current consumers. Trade mark law shapes 
what consumers see and hear. In so doing it constructs their reaction to trade signs and makes 
it more or less likely that they will associate particular signs with particular undertakings.10 If 
trade mark law inevitably shapes as well as reflects consumer responses it seems 
unremarkable to suggest that courts should pay attention to how they would like consumers 
to respond:11 a decision that can only be made by reference to some extraneous normative 
goal. 
  Insofar as there is a problem with the prevailing approach, it lies in the manner in 
which outcomes are explained and justified. Reliance on the hypothetical consumer can 
obscure the weight that is being given to pro-competition concerns and other policy goals. 
Moreover, there is the danger that our hypothetical consumer may be disguising significant 
inconsistencies in outcome. The hypothetical consumer provides such a fluid standard that it 
is open to a tribunal to take a very personal view of the merits of the case and then attribute 
to the hypothetical consumer whatever reaction is necessary to produce the preferred 
outcome. These problems are rendered less visible by the degree of ambiguity that continues 
to surround the nature of the hypothetical consumer standard. In most jurisdictions, there is 
an imperfect consensus around the question of the extent to which the hypothetical 
consumer is a normative rather than an empirical construct.12 This makes the hypothetical 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ デWゲデ ケ┌ｷデW SｷaaWヴWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏが ゲ;┞が ヮ;デWﾐデ ﾉ;┘げゲ けヮWヴゲﾗﾐ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉWS ｷﾐ デｴW ;ヴデげく In patent law 
there is a clear understanding that the person skilled in the art is a legal construct, and hence 
that it would never be appropriate to point to the understanding of a group of technically 
qualified individuals as being determinative of the legal outcome. The unequivocally artificial 
nature of the person skilled in the art means that courts have had to spell out in some detail 
デｴｷゲ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWデｷI;ﾉ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐげゲ ;デデヴｷH┌デWゲく13 
                                                          
10 ‘く B┌ヴヴWﾉﾉが Hく BW┗WヴﾉW┞ “ﾏｷデｴ ;ﾐS Aく CﾗﾉWﾏ;ﾐが けTｴヴWW-dimensional Trade Marks: Should the Directive be 
‘Wゲｴ;ヮWSいげ ｷﾐ Nく D;┘ゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Aく Fｷヴデｴ ふWSゲくぶが Trade Marks Retrospective (Vol 7, Perspectives on Intellectual 
Property, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 150-ヱヵヱき Bく BWWHWが け“W;ヴIｴ ;ﾐS PWヴゲ┌;ゲｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ふヲヰヰヵぶ ヱヰン 
Michigan Law Review 2020, 2066-7.   
11 Some evidence of courts taking this approach can be found in their frequent reliance on a standard defined in 
デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;HﾉWげ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲぎ ゲWW, e.g., Case Cに329/02 P SAT-1 v OHIM, [2005] 1 CMLR 57 [24], referring to 
;ﾐ ;┗Wヴ;ｪW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ け┘ｴﾗ ｷゲ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;Hﾉ┞ ┘Wﾉﾉ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWS ;ﾐS ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;Hﾉ┞ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;ﾐデ ;ﾐS IｷヴI┌ﾏゲヮWIデげく This 
suggests a desire to require consumers to pay attention to their own interests.  
12 Dinwoodie and Gangjee supra n 3.  
13 See also Whirlpool Corp v Kenwood Ltd [2008] EWHC 1930 (Ch) at [70] (Geoffrey Hobbs QC, Deputy Judge) for 
discussion of the differences between the person skilled in the art and the average consumer. 
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   In contrast, in the trade mark field the hypothetical consumer is a less certain figure. 
Iﾐゲﾗa;ヴ ;ゲ ┘W ｴ;┗W ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIW ;ゲ デﾗ デｴｷゲ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐげゲ ;デデヴｷH┌デWゲ, the guidance is pitched at such a 
general level that it leaves tribunals enormous latitude. In Europe, for example, we are told 
that the average consumer is けreasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and 
IｷヴI┌ﾏゲヮWIデげく Wｴ;デ デｴｷゲ ﾏW;ﾐゲ ｷﾐ ヮヴ;IデｷIWが ｴﾗ┘ever, is much less certain. Take the word mark 
ZINC registered for nightclubs. One might reasonably take the view that there is a stronger 
case that XINC(ZN) should be regarded as confusingly similar than XINC alone. In the former 
case the presence of the chemical symbol for zinc helps convey the same idea and points 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾐﾗ┌ﾐIW デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ;ゲ け┣ｷﾐIげ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ けW┝-ｷﾐIげく B┌デ デｴｷゲ IﾗﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ 
follows if the reasonably well-informed consumer remembers a modicum of high school 
chemistry.14 It is at this level that there is scope for inconsistency. As a consequence, within 
Australian law we find a case involving fabrics sold to members of the public in which it was 
ゲ;ｷS デｴ;デ けIﾗﾏヮﾉWデW ｷｪﾐﾗヴ;ﾐIW ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ ; Cヴ┌ゲ;SWヴ ┘;ゲ ﾗヴ ┘ｴﾗ C;Wゲ;ヴ ┘;ゲ ﾏ;┞ HW ｷﾏヮ┌デWS to 
デｴW ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ H┌┞Wヴげく15 However, we find other cases in which it was implicitly held that the 
average Australian purchaser of refrigerators could be taken to know that the Coldstream 
Guards is a famous regiment in the British army.16  
The Crusader / Coldstream Guards example does not に as some uncharitable foreign 
readers might assume に reflect a set of strange priorities within the Australian education 
system. Rather, it demonstrates that the attributes of the average consumer can be readily 
manipulated to produce whatever result the tribunal considers normatively desirable. At the 
same time, however, tribunals genuinely care about the reaction of real consumers. This is 
most obviously evident in the desire of common law courts to give weight to evidence of 
actual confusion. But more generally, tribunals really do want to take account of how real 
consumers behave. Consequently, tribunals sometimes shift to treating the average 
consumer as something much more like an empirical construct.  
 There are good reasons to suggest that the mutable nature of the average consumer 
test undermines the consistency and predictability of outcomes, and that there are more 
transparent ways to build policy-based limitations into trade mark reasoning, a point that 
                                                          
14 See also R. Burrell and M. Handler, Australian Trade Mark Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 
213-215. 
15 Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641, 659.  
16 Coldstream Refrigerators Ltd v Aircrafts Pty Ltd (1950) 20 AOJP 1491. 
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Dinwoodie and Gangjee have eloquently made.17 For present purposes though, the key point 
is that until we are clearer in our own minds as to how the decision-making of real consumers 
maps onto our legal tests, it is difficult to articulate what role psychology might play. 
Psychology may be able to tell us what real consumers think, but if we are not sure how much 
we care about what they think, we will struggle to know what to do with this information.    
A second potential barrier to drawing on insights from psychology when dealing with 
registered trade marks is that the property right in such a mark is determined by its bureau-
cratic form. The process of registration serves to abstract away from marketplace reality, and 
the scope of protection will be determined by reference to what the owner has registered. If 
the owner has secured protection for a word mark, the mark protected by law will be that 
word written in any script and reproduced in any colour.18 Similarly, the goods or services will 
be determined by reference to the specification, and it is very likely that this will be drafted 
ｷﾐ ; ┘;┞ デｴ;デ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ;ﾉゲﾗ ゲWヴ┗W デﾗ W┝デWﾐS デｴW ﾗ┘ﾐWヴげゲ ﾏﾗﾐﾗヮﾗﾉ┞ HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴW ｪﾗﾗSゲ ﾗヴ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ 
that it actually produces or provides.19 Consider, for example, a trader who sells T-shirts under 
デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆ BU‘‘ELLが ┘ｷデｴ けB┌ヴヴWﾉﾉげ ｷﾐ┗;ヴｷ;Hﾉ┞ ;ヮヮW;ヴｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ ; ヮ┌ヴヮﾉW I┌ヴゲｷ┗W aﾗﾐデ. Absent any 
prior conflicting mark on the register, it would be perfectly possible to register BURRELL as a 
word mark with ; ゲヮWIｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ けIﾉﾗデｴｷﾐｪげく Tｴｷゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ IWヴデ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ デｴW ﾗ┘ﾐWヴ ﾗa 
the BURRELL mark to bring a successful action against a defendant using the mark BIRRELL 
reproduced in a very different yellow font in relation to three-piece suits: the marks would 
almost certainly be regarded as similar (there only being one letter different, and differences 
in the get-up of the marks being ignored because BURRELL is registered as a word mark) and 
デｴW ｪﾗﾗSゲ ;ヴW ｷSWﾐデｷI;ﾉ ふHﾗデｴ HWｷﾐｪ けIﾉﾗデｴｷﾐｪげぶく YWデ デｴWヴW ┘ﾗ┌ﾉd seem to be very little danger 
of confusion in the marketplace.20 
The above example demonstrates that the registered trade mark system gives rights 
                                                          
17 Supra n 2.  
18 Reed Executive Plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] ETMR 56, [79]; cf Specsavers International 
Healthcare Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd (C-252/12) [2013] ETMR 46. 
19 Fﾗヴ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ゲWW ‘く B┌ヴヴWﾉﾉ ;ﾐS Mく H;ﾐSﾉWヴが けDｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ ‘Wｪｷゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ヱΑ Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems 713, 716-723. 
20 In response in might be argued that use on T-ゲｴｷヴデゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ゲ┌aaｷIｷWﾐデ デﾗ ヮヴWゲWヴ┗W ; ヴWｪｷゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ けIﾉﾗデｴｷﾐｪげ 
rendering the mark vulnerable to partial revocation for non-use. This may be correct, but it needs to be 
remembered (a) that for the first few years of the registration no such challenge can be brought; and (b) this 
example is intended to illustrate the point as clearly as possible, but the broader point is that the terminology 
used in specifications always carries with it the possibility of extending protection beyond the goods that are 
actually produced by the owner.  
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that go beyond anything that would be warranted if preventing confusion were our sole con-
cern. The best (or rather least bad) explanation for allowing trade mark owners to carve out 
a broader sphere of protection than a right against confusion would warrant is that this gives 
trade mark owners a degree of space around their brands. This space acts as an incentive to 
register, and the register creates a source of public information which has public value, spe-
cifically, by reducing clearance costs for businesses that are trying to identify whether a sign 
remains available for use as a trade mark.21 If, however, the registered trade mark system is 
only loosely tethered to the goal of preventing confusion, it may not be immediately obvious 
what role psychology can play when assessing whether infringement has occurred.22  
In order to explore this point further it is necessary to analyse provisions that appear to 
turn on the likelihood of confusion. How can we justify our analysis in the face of tests for 
infringement that put confusion at the heart of the analysis? In short, our response is that 
provisions and legal tests that appear to turn on confusion are generally not what they seem. 
The confusion enquiry is not, and cannot, be at large if we are to persist with the idea that 
the nature of trade mark rights is determined by their bureaucratic form.23 Matters like the 
けｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;デｷﾗﾐげ デWゲデ ﾗa E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ ﾉ;┘ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ﾐWWS デﾗ HW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWS ┘ｷデｴ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;HﾉW 
care. This test appears to tells us that the likelihood of confusion is central to the infringement 
enquiry: we judge confusion in the round; we undertake a global assessment; and determi-
nations of similarity of marks and similarity of goods go to the single question of whether 
there is likely to be confusion in the marketplace.24 In reality, however, the global apprecia-
tion test allows us to sidestep the question of whether anyone is actually likely to be confused 
in the marketplace. The similarity of marks / goods enquiries are generally treated as deter-
minative of the likelihood of confusion: i.e. we assume there will be confusion if the marks 
and goods or services are objectively similar. To reiterate, this is inevitable if we are to respect 
                                                          
21 ‘く B┌ヴヴWﾉﾉが けTヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ B┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;IｷWゲげ ｷﾐ Gく Dｷﾐ┘ﾗﾗSｷW ;ﾐS Mく J;ﾐｷゲ ふWSゲくぶが Trademark Law and Theory: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar ヲヰヰΒぶき ‘く T┌ゲｴﾐWデが け‘Wｪｷゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ 
MﾗSWヴﾐ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ヱンヰ Harvard Law Review 867. 
22  It also becomes much more difficult to imagine empirical tests, as discussed further below.   
23 It is also hard to pinpoint what the contribution of trade mark law would be, above and beyond general unfair 
competition laws, if confusion was the only consideration in infringement. In addition, practicality is a concern. 
If infringement turned entirely on a factual likelihood of confusion, then so should registrability (registration 
reflecting what marks can and cannot be used in the marketplace) and it would become very difficult to 
administer the system or process the tens of thousands of trade mark applications that trade mark offices 
receive every year. 
24 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc (C-39/97) [1998] ECR I-5507 at [16]; O2 Holdings Ltd v 
Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd (C-533/06) [2008] ECR I-4231. 
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the idea that the boundaries of protection for trade marks are determined by their bureau-
cratic form.   
Having said this, it should be acknowledged that courts do try to find ways of bringing 
confusion back into the analysis. One means of so doing is by taking account of extraneous 
factors, that is, marketplace factors that make confusion more or less likely. If any area of 
trade mark law seems to suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity, it is the question of when 
such extraneous factors are and are not relevant to the infringement enquiry. But it should 
tell us something that the rules on extraneous factors lack conceptual clarity in each of Aus-
tralia, Singapore and Europe.25 Ultimately, this is because courts are having to walk an impos-
sible line. On the one hand, courts are trying to ﾆWWヮ デｴW ﾗ┘ﾐWヴげゲ ﾏﾗﾐﾗヮﾗﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ justifiable 
bounds by taking account of whether consumers will in fact be confused. On the other hand, 
they are trying to preserve the essential nature of the registered trade mark right as a right 
determined by the scope of the registration. 
To elaborate on the point about how courts seek to make confusion relevant to the 
analysis, one might also point to the insistence in some jurisdictions that it is only certain 
デ┞ヮWゲ ﾗa け┌ゲWげ ﾗa ; ゲｷｪﾐ デｴ;デ I;ﾐ デヴｷｪｪWヴ ; aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa ｷﾐaヴｷﾐｪWﾏWﾐデく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ┌ﾐSWヴ ヮヴW-
harmonised British trade mark law (that is, under the Trade Marks Act 1938 and its precur-
sors) there was a req┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW SWaWﾐS;ﾐデげゲ ┌ゲW HW け┌ゲW ;ゲ ; デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆげ for infringe-
ment to be established. The principal function of this test was to exclude liability in cases 
┘ｴWヴW デｴW SWaWﾐS;ﾐデげゲ ┌ゲW aWﾉﾉ prima facie ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW ゲIﾗヮW ﾗa デｴW デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ﾗ┘ﾐWヴげゲ ﾏﾗど
nopoly, but where confusion was unlikely.26 This technique continues to be employed in a 
                                                          
25 In Australia the leading authorities are MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd (1999) 42 IPR 561 and 
CA Henschke and Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42, but many years on the application of 
principles established in these cases remains difficult and controversial. See Burrell and Handler, supra n 7, at 
pp. 398-401. In Singapore the leading case is Staywell Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide, Inc ぷヲヰヱヴへ ヱ “L‘ Γヱヱく Fﾗヴ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ゲWW Dく T;ﾐ ;ﾐS Bく Fﾗﾗが けTｴW E┝デヴ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲ F;Iデﾗヴゲ ‘┌ﾉW ｷﾐ 
Trademark Law: Avoiding Confusion or Simply Confuゲｷﾐｪいげ ぷヲヰヱヶへ Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 118 (arguing 
aﾗヴ ; ﾏﾗ┗W デﾗ ; ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ デﾗ ┘ｴWヴW ┘W ヮ;┞ ﾉWゲゲ ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デｷI aﾗヴﾏぶく TｴW ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa けW┝デヴ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲ 
a;Iデﾗヴゲげ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ E┌ヴﾗヮWが H┌デ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ ;ﾐS ┌ﾐIWヴデ;ｷﾐデｷWゲ ヴ;ｷゲW デｴWｷヴ ｴW;Sく On the one hand, one can 
see in the Sky v Skype dispute a desire to preserve the bureaucratic, paper-based nature of the registered trade 
mark right (See Case T 184/13 Skype Ultd v OHIM (5 May 2015) (General Court)). On the other hand, the Office 
has signalled that it will take some types of marketplace factors into account even when dealing with relative 
grounds of refusal: see EUIPO Examination Guidelines (1.10.2017), Part C Opposition, Section 2, ch. 2 
ふけIﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ ﾗa ｪﾗﾗSゲ ;ﾐS ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲげぶき Iｴく ン ふけヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ ヮ┌HﾉｷI ;ﾐS けSWｪヴWW ﾗa ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐげぶき Iｴく ヶ ふﾗデｴWヴ a;Iデﾗヴゲぶく 
Much like in Australia and Singapore, the Office tries to draw a distinction between general conditions in the 
trade (relevant) and specific marketing strategies (irrelevant). But this distinction is fragile, not least because 
けデｴW デヴ;SWげ I;ﾐ HW Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌IデWS ﾏﾗヴW ﾗヴ ﾉWゲゲ ﾐ;ヴヴﾗ┘ﾉ┞く  
26 See Iヴ┗ｷﾐｪげゲ YW;ゲデ-Vite Ltd v Horsenail (1934) 51 RPC 110 ふHﾗ┌ゲW ﾗa LﾗヴSゲ ｴﾗﾉSｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ｴ;S HWWﾐ ﾐﾗ け┌ゲW 
;ゲ ; ﾏ;ヴﾆげ ｷﾐ ; Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;デｷ┗W ;S┗Wヴデｷゲｷﾐｪ I;ゲWぶく OﾐW ﾗa デｴW present authors has defended this interpretation of 
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number of Commonwealth countries, including Australia.27 Something similar can also be 
ゲWWﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW けa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲげ SW┗WﾉﾗヮWS H┞ デｴW Cﾗ┌ヴデ ﾗa J┌ゲデｷIWく B┞ IヴW;デｷﾐｪ ; ﾏWIhanism 
that serves to soften the impact of the double identity provision of European law (that on its 
face imposes strict liability in cases where a defendant has used an identical mark on identical 
goods), the Court has found a way of protecting defendants whose actions are highly unlikely 
to cause confusion, but who may not be able to bring themselves within a nominate defence.  
Again, courts are to be applauded for seeking to cabin registered trade mark rights in a 
way that reflects their ultimate justification. However, much as with our comment about the 
inevitably strained rules that determine when extraneous factors are and are not relevant to 
; aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa ｷﾐaヴｷﾐｪWﾏWﾐデが ┘W ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ┌ﾐゲ┌ヴヮヴｷゲWS ｷa SﾗIデヴｷﾐWゲ ﾉｷﾆW け┌ゲW ;ゲ ; デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆげ ;ﾐS 
けa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲげ ゲ┌aaWヴ aヴﾗﾏ ; SWｪヴWW ﾗa ｷﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ incoherence. For present purposes, 
however, the key insight is that the rules by which an assessment of the likelihood of actual 
confusion in the marketplace are incorporated into the infringement enquiry form part of a 
carefully constructed, but ultimately entirely artificial, ecosystem. If one understands the role 
of psychology as being primarily about collecting evidence of how consumers actually respond 
in the marketplace to the signs and stimuli to which they are exposed に as our preoccupation 
with the reception of survey evidence tends to suggest に then it is easy to conclude that psy-
chology cannot be given a place within the registered trade mark law without disrupting the 
artificial environment we inhabit.  
There are even more formidable barriers to courts drawing on psychological evidence 
in cases in which dilution is alleged. The premise of legal rules that seek to prevent trade mark 
Sｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ デｴ;デ W┗Wﾐ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ ┘ｴﾗ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ Iﾗﾐa┌ゲWS H┞ ; SWaWﾐS;ﾐデげゲ ┌ゲW of a similar mark 
に who do not think there is any trade connection に will have their response to the original 
changed by dilutive use in ways that harm the trade mark owner. The ultimate problem for 
tribunals is that it is far from clear that the harms that dilution guards against are real or, to 
the extent such harms are real, whether they are likely to occur in the circumstances that the 
law imagines.  
                                                          
the trade mark use threshold in detail elsewhere: Burrell and Handler, supra n 14, at pp. 375-387. We accept, 
however, that it remains controversial. For a contrary view see M. Davison and F. di Giantomasゲﾗが けUゲW ;ゲ ; 
Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆぎ A┗ﾗｷSｷﾐｪ Cﾗﾐa┌ゲｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴWﾐ CﾗﾐゲｷSWヴｷﾐｪ Dｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐげ ぷヲヰヰΓへ EIP‘ ヴヴンく         
27 See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), s. 120 and, e.g., Shell Co Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd (1963) 
109 CLR 407; Irrewarra Estate Pty Limited (t/as Irrewarra Sourdough) [2012] FCA 592 (2012) 292 ALR 101; Coca-
Cola Company v PepsiCo Inc (No 2) [2014] FCA 1287 (2014) 322 ALR 505. 
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Consider, for example, what we know about the tarnishment of brands, bearing in mind 
that this is normally regarded as the more intuitively appealing and hence least controversial 
subset of dilution.28  Work by marketing researchers on authorised brand extensions suggests 
that even in cases where consumers are disappointed by the new product, their negative 
evaluation of the extension will not feedback to impact on their view of the original.29 As 
Michael Handler has noted, this must call into question whether consumers would ever think 
less of a brand where they understand that the product or service in question is being used 
by an unrelated entity. Ia デｴW┞ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ デｴｷﾐﾆ ﾉWゲゲ ﾗa ; Hヴ;ﾐS ┘ｴWﾐ ｷデ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ けデ;ヴﾐｷゲｴWSげ H┞ デｴW 
trade mark owner, there is no reason to conclude that they would think less of a brand when 
the use is clearly unauthorised.30 Still more dramatically, we have the results of Christo 
Bﾗゲｴﾗaaげゲ ;デデWﾏヮデゲ デﾗ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴW デ;ヴﾐｷゲｴﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲく31 Boshoff conducted a study in which he 
exposed consumers to advertisements for well-known brands and to advertisements for tar-
nished versions of these brands. Importantly, when the participants were exposed to the tar-
nished versions first their subsequent reactions to the original brands were actually more 
positive than in cases where they were exposed to the original brands first.32   
Attempts to draw on psychology in cases where blurring is alleged would be equally 
fraught. Insofar as there are studies that attempt to show that consumer recognition of a 
mark can be adversely affected by use of a similar sign on dissimilar goods, they do not begin 
to show that traders would suffer any financial harm from a delayed reaction time that has 
to be measured in milliseconds.33 Moreover, even within the most famous study of this type, 
we find examples where use of a mark on dissimilar goods actually served to increase recog-
nition of the original brand.34 Then there is the problem that in most jurisdictions protection 
                                                          
28 “く ‘ｷWヴゲﾗﾐが けTｴW M┞デｴ ;ﾐS ‘W;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa Dｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヱヱ Duke Law and Technology Review 212, 246; M. Handler, 
けWｴ;デ Can Harm the Reputation of a Trademark? A Critical Re-E┗;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Dｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ H┞ T;ヴﾐｷゲｴﾏWﾐデげ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ヱヰヶ 
Trademark Reporter 639, 640.  
29 Hく “ﾃﾜSｷﾐ ;ﾐS Fく Tﾜヴﾐが けWｴWﾐ Cﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾗﾐ Cｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ Bヴ;ﾐS AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲぎ A Fヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ aﾗヴ UﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ 
Consumer Responses to Brand Image Incongruity (2006) 5 Journal of Consumer Behaviour 32, in particular, at 38 
(and the work cited therein).  
30 Handler, supra n 28, at 680. 
31 Cく Bﾗゲｴﾗaaが けTｴW L;S┞ Dﾗデｴ PヴﾗデWゲデ Tﾗﾗ M┌Iｴぎ A NW┌ヴﾗヮｴ┞ゲｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗W ﾗﾐ Bヴ;ﾐS T;ヴﾐｷゲｴﾏWﾐデげ (2016) 
25 Journal of Product and Brand Management 196. 
32 As determined by using WﾉWIデヴﾗWﾐIWヮｴ;ﾉﾗｪヴ;ヮｴ┞ ﾗヴ けEEGげ デﾗ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴW Hヴ;ｷﾐ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデ┞ and electromyography or 
けEMGげ デﾗ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ｷﾐ a;Iｷ;ﾉ ﾏ┌ゲIﾉWゲく  
33 ‘く T┌ゲｴﾐWデが けGﾗﾐW ｷﾐ ヶヰ MｷﾉﾉｷゲWIﾗﾐSゲぎ Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ L;┘ ;ﾐS Cﾗｪﾐｷデｷ┗W “IｷWﾐIWげ ふヲヰヰΒぶ Βヶ Texas Law Review 507. 
34 Mく Mﾗヴヴｷﾐ ;ﾐS Jく J;IﾗH┞が けTヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ Dｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐぎ EﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ MW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ aﾗヴ ;ﾐ Eﾉ┌ゲｷ┗W CﾗﾐIWヮデげ ふヲヰヰヰぶ ヱΓ Journal of 
Public Policy and Marketing 265 (the authors of this study this study seek to demonstrate via laboratory studies 
that blurring tends to increase information processing times with the result that it takes consumers longer to 
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against blurring is only conferred on marks that meet a certain threshold of public recogni-
tion.35 Iﾐ デｴW ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa デｴW E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ヴWｪｷﾏWが ｷデ ｷゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ けﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ┘ｷデｴ ; ヴWヮ┌デ;デｷﾗﾐげ 
that enjoy protection against blurring. However, when one interrogates the harm that pro-
tection against blurring is intended to prevent, it is said to be about preserving the commer-
cial identity of the mark; it prevents ┌ゲWゲ デｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW けSWデヴｷﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ デﾗ デｴW SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗W Iｴ;ヴど
;IデWヴ ﾗa デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆげく The underlying concern is that use of a similar mark on dissimilar goods 
and services can inhibit the ability of the original デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆ デﾗ けヴW;Iｴ ﾗ┌デげ デﾗ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲく 
There appears to be a growing consensus that it is counter-intuitive to suggest that this type 
of harm should only be a cause for concern in cases where the mark enjoys a reputation.36 
Such marks are, by definition, already firmly fixed in the public mind and the risk that third 
ヮ;ヴデ┞ ┌ゲWゲ ┘ｷﾉﾉ Sｷﾏｷﾐｷゲｴ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲげ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ヴWI;ﾉﾉ デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾏ┌ゲデ HW 
relatively limited.  
It must, however, be remembered that courts have to take the antidilution provisions 
as they find them. It is of no assistance to judges to tell them that there is a discipline that 
may help demonstrate that dilution harms do not occur or, at most, that dilutive uses will 
sometimes impair brand recognition, but will sometimes enhance it in ways that are appar-
ently impossible to predict. Admittedly, psychologists might be able to demonstrate that con-
sumers will indeed draw links between unconnected products. They might well be able to 
demonstrate, say, that customers of a Nike café have the sportswear company brought to 
mind. But if this makes dilution easier to establish に SWゲヮｷデW デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ ﾐﾗ ｴ;ヴﾏ デﾗ NｷﾆWげゲ 
interests can be shown に this would hardly be desirable.37 The concern that the reputation 
threshold makes the action for blurring entirely incoherent adds a further level of uncertainty. 
                                                          
recall the original brand. However, although this was generally found to be the case they reported that 
advertisemWﾐデゲ aﾗヴ けH┞;デデ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲげ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗WS ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ ヴWI;ﾉﾉ ﾗa H┞;デデ ;ゲ ; Hヴ;ﾐS ﾗa ｴﾗデWﾉぶく  
35 Tﾗ ｪ;ｷﾐ ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐ ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW L;ﾐｴ;ﾏ AIデ ｷﾐ デｴW U“が ; ﾏ;ヴﾆ ﾏ┌ゲデ HW けa;ﾏﾗ┌ゲげぎ 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). In 
デｴW E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Uﾐｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾏ;ヴﾆゲ デｴ;デ けｴ;┗W ; ヴWヮ┌デ;デｷﾗﾐげ ;ヴW ヮヴﾗデWIデWS ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ Sｷﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐぎ European Parliament 
and Council Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2009 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to 
trade marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EC), art. 5(2); Council Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the 
Community trade mark, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 December 2015, art. 9(1)(c), 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 (EC).  
36 See R. Burrell and M. Handler, 'Reputation in European Trade Mark Law: A Re-examination' (2016) 17 ERA 
Forum 85.   
37 This is arguably one of the problems with the way in which survey evidence has been employed in some US 
dilution cases, with the evidence going solely to the question of whether consumers would be likely to link the 
two products. Our thanks go to Dev Gangjee for this observation. See also British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc v 
Microsoft Corporation [2013] EWHC 1826 (Ch) ┘ｴWヴW ; ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ ┘;ゲ ;IIWヮデWS デﾗ Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴ デｴ;デ デｴW SWaWﾐS;ﾐデげゲ 
ﾏ;ヴﾆ けI;ﾉﾉWS デﾗ ﾏｷﾐSげ デｴW ヴWｪｷゲデWヴWS ﾏ;ヴﾆく 
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In particular, there must be a concern that the evidence will suggest that the associations that 
consumers draw between a mark and particular goods / services is most likely to be disrupted 
(blurred) in cases where the senior mark is still struggling for a foothold in the market (i.e. the 
harm that blurring is intended to prevent will only arise in cases where the statutory threshold 
for antidilution protection has not been met). Courts cannot rely on such information to write 
legislative provisions out of the Act. 
Consequently, the temptation for courts is to do their best to impose liability in cases 
of the type that the legislature must be presumed to have had in mind, without drawing on 
insights from psychology. A discipline that suggests that antidilution protection should be re-
thought in its entirety may be interesting to academics and ought to be interesting to policy-
makers, but is unlikely to command much attention from judges, at least when they are acting 
in their judicial capacity.    
 
III. PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT  
If psychology is to have a greater bearing on trade mark law, we need to recognise that many 
of the questions with which trade mark law is concerned do not lend themselves to an 
empirical or scientific answer. Trade mark law is not only concerned with whether consumers 
are likely to be confused: it also quite rightly takes account of a range of other policy goals. 
For better or worse the registration system confers a set of abstract rights and the nature of 
these rights needs to be respected; courts have to take the legislative framework as they find 
it, proving that the framework is deeply flawed is of little assistance. As trade mark lawyers 
we might do well to be more open and explicit about these matters, but they do pose very 
real constraints on how we engage with psychologists and psychological evidence.  
Moreover, before charting any new relationship between the disciplines, we also need 
to take seriously the constraints imposed on judges by the need to ensure the efficient 
administration of justice. Not only do courts have to take extraneous policy concerns into 
account, such as the impact of their decisions on competition, they also need to pay attention 
to how litigation can and should be run. Most obviously, they need to think about the costs 
ﾗa ﾉｷデｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐく Tｴｷゲ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ヮﾉ;IWS aヴﾗﾐデ ;ﾐS IWﾐデヴW ﾗa デｴW UKげゲ Cｷ┗ｷﾉ PヴﾗIWS┌ヴW ‘┌ﾉWゲが 
┘ｴｷIｴ ゲWデ ﾗ┌デ ;ﾐ けﾗ┗WヴヴｷSｷﾐｪ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W ﾗa Wﾐ;Hﾉｷﾐｪ デｴW Iﾗ┌ヴデ デﾗ SW;ﾉ ┘ｷデｴ I;ゲWゲ ﾃ┌ゲデﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ;デ 
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prﾗヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ;デW Iﾗゲデげく38 The potential for litigation costs to balloon is an obvious concern about 
trying to draw on psychological evidence,39 particularly when this question is being viewed 
almost entirely through the lens of whether courts should make greater use of survey 
evidence in infringement proceedings.40 Surveys add significantly to the costs of the litigation, 
both in direct costs in arranging for surveys to be conducted, but also because they cause 
delay and take up significant court time because of the evidentiary tussles that seem 
inevitably to follow in their wake. Courts are therefore right to approach survey evidence with 
a good deal of care.41    
The cost of litigation is not the only matter to which courts need to turn their 
attention. Practitioners from disciplines outside law are sometimes unaware of a range of 
considerations internal to court processes that are unrelated to (and even counter to) the 
pursuit of objective truth. Courts also need the freedom to take account of how the parties 
have conducted themselves during the course of the litigation, whether the case has been 
properly pleaded and so forth. Here it must be remembered that such considerations are not 
removed from the demands of justice. If parties do not conduct themselves appropriately the 
administration of justice rapidly becomes impossible. Holding parties to their pleadings is an 
important part of ensuring that each side can prepare its case properly with adequate 
knowledge of what the other side is claiming and without an undue element of surprise. 
AHﾗ┗W ;ﾉﾉ SWaWﾐS;ﾐデゲ ﾏ┌ゲデ HW ｪｷ┗Wﾐ け; a;ｷヴ ｷSW; ﾗa デｴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲ ;ﾐS ヴｷゲﾆゲげ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS 
the claimant prevail.42 Still more generally, we ought to respect the craft involved in judicial 
decision-making. We ought not expect judges to put aside more intuitive considerations 
ふけIﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ゲWﾐゲWげぶ ┘ｴWﾐ SWIｷSｷﾐｪ I;ゲWゲ, and nor would we want them to do so.43     
One of the problems with surveys in particular is that they are often presented in trade 
mark litigation as though they provide the definitive answer to the question that is to be 
                                                          
38 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) Rule 1.1. The court has a general power to exclude, admissible evidence in 
pursuit of this overriding objective: Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) Rule 32.1.  
39 See, e.g., Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer Plc [2013] 2 All ER 663; Neutrogena Corp v Golden Ltd [1996] RPC 
473, 485に486; Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277; Cadbury 
Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719, 726. 
40 Empirical evidence that might be provided from the disciplines of psychology or marketing vary considerably: 
from broad representative surveys of existing consumers, to small experiments which seek to test very specific 
(and isolated) questions, as illustrated in the next Part.  
41 For a detailed exegesis of these points see Weatherall, supra n 2.   
42 Kirin-Amgen Inc v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc. (No. 2) [2002] RPC 3, [34].   
43 A point made convincingly by Posner: R. Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2010), in 
particular, at pp. 116-117.  
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determined: they either prove or disprove the likelihood of confusion and hence are 
dispositive of the outcome. Trade mark law has left itself open to this problem because, as 
we have seen, there has been a tendency to submerge other policy considerations within the 
confusion enquiry. Equally, however, there can be no question that courts have often been 
presented with poorly designed surveys and overblown claims from the authors of these 
surveys.44 Indeed, one of these things that we have been most struck by from the 
psychologists with whom we have collaborated is their scepticism as to whether it would ever 
be possible to design a robust test for whether confusion has occurred or is likely to occur. 
The problems, it seems, are manifold but include:  
(1) How to separate legally irrelevant background confusion (some consumers will just 
mix up Visa and Mastercard, or Duracell and Eveready) from confusion caused by the use of 
similar signs. 
(2) How to interrogate consumer responses to signs when に however gently and 
indirectly this is done に this is likely to cause participants to engage with what a sign conveys 
in ways that may not map onto real shopping scenarios. This is because surveys ask people 
explicitly to think about marks and signs, whereas for everyday purchases we will often shop 
ﾗﾐ け;┌デﾗヮｷﾉﾗデげが ヴWﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ ┌ﾐIﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲｷﾐｪが ┘ｴｷﾉW ┘W ;ヴW H┌ゲ┞ デ;ﾉﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ 
the phone or distracting children from the call of the confectionary aisle or preparing a lecture 
in our heads.45 
(3) How to press participants on the nature of their response to ensure that they are 
engaged with thought processes relevant to the legal enquiry, and doing so without asking 
leading questions. Take, for example, a participant who on seeing the junior mark states that 
デｴｷゲ けヴWﾏｷﾐSゲげ ｴWヴ ﾗa デｴW ゲWﾐｷﾗヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆく DﾗWゲ ゲｴW ﾏW;ﾐ ふ;ぶ デｴ;デ ゲｴW ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ﾉWaデ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴｷﾐｪ 
whether the marks come from the same trade source (confusion); or (b) that the junior mark 
けI;ﾉﾉゲ デﾗ ﾏｷﾐSげ デｴW ゲWﾐｷﾗヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆ H┌デ ｷゲ けﾗH┗ｷﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞げ aヴﾗﾏ ; SｷaaWヴWﾐデ デヴ;SW ゲﾗ┌ヴIW ふﾉWｪ;ﾉﾉ┞ 
irrelevant, at least outside of the dilution context) or (c) that she takes it as a signal from an 
unrelated trade source that this is intended to be a competing product (legally irrelevant and 
likely to be beneficial for competition)? Any attempt to press the participant on what she 
                                                          
44 See eg CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1999) 47 IPR 63 (small/unbalanced sample); Re 
Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v Power Brewing Company Limited [1992] FCA 638 (methodology not explained); South 
Australian Brewing Co Pty Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 719 (questions did not sufficiently 
distinguish between use of the word Showdown as a mark, and use of the word to refer to certain AFL games). 
45 See Weatherall, supra n 2 and the sources cited therein for detailed discussion of these issues.   
16 
 
means is likely to condemned as leading, and quite rightly so: when the participant said she 
┘;ゲ けヴWﾏｷﾐSWSげが ゲｴW ｷゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ ｴ;┗W ﾏW;ﾐデ ゲｴW ┘;ゲ ヴWﾏｷﾐSWSく Ia ゲｴW ｷゲ ヮヴWゲゲed to elaborate 
any additional explanation she provides may well be generated entirely ex post.46   
 Moving away from surveys, we need to be alive to the problems of expert evidence 
more generally. These problems have been rehearsed in the pages of law reviews for 150 
years or more.47 Among the more prominent are selection bias (parties are able to call experts 
whose views fall outside the scientific mainstream and present these views as if they were on 
an equal footing with orthodox opinion); loss of objectivity (experts, no matter how 
professional, will align themselves with the instructing party) and mission creep (the danger 
of experts being pulled into giving opinion on matters outside their core area of expertise). 
To this need to be added problems of cost and the rather more amorphous concern that the 
けH;デデﾉW ﾗa W┝ヮWヴデゲげ ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐWゲ デｴW ｷﾐデWｪヴｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW ﾃ┌SｷIｷ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲく48 Courts are, of course, 
alive to these concerns and there have been a series of innovations, ranging from greater use 
ﾗa けｴﾗデ デ┌HHｷﾐｪげ デﾗ ヴWﾏﾗ┗;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ aヴﾗﾏ ゲ┌ｷデ デｴ;デ W┝ヮWヴデ ┘ｷデﾐWゲゲWゲ ヮヴW┗ｷﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ 
enjoyed in relation to their participation in legal proceedings.49 But the need for such 
innovations and the fact that discomfort about the role of experts in court can be traced back 
to when recognisably modern scientific professions emerged50 should perhaps alert us to the 
fact that expert evidence is never going to be free from difficulty. We should therefore hardly 
be surprised if those responsible for administering the system are less than enthused by calls 
from academics for greater use of experts in trade mark proceedings when, ultimately, we 
have been muddling along quite nicely without their input.  
                                                          
46 This is not, of course, invariably the case に sometimes we misspeak or are careless in our choice of language. 
In these cases a follow up question may allow us to get closer to what the participant meant by the original 
response, but there is no way to separate out these cases from those in which the follow up question prompts 
a deeper level of thought or engagement.  Our thanks go to Lionel Bently for pushing us to clarify this point.   
47 Fﾗヴ W;ヴﾉ┞ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ;デデ;IｴWS デﾗ W┝ヮWヴデ デWゲデｷﾏﾗﾐ┞ ゲWWが Wくｪくが Eく W;ゲｴH┌ヴﾐが けTWゲデｷﾏﾗﾐ┞ 
of Experts, (1866) 1 American Law Review ヴヵき Lく H;ﾐSが けHｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS Pヴ;IデｷI;ﾉ CﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ‘Wｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ E┝ヮWヴデ 
TWゲデｷﾏﾗﾐ┞げ ふヱΓヰヱぶ 15 Harvard Law Review 40.  
48 A ヮﾗｷﾐデ ﾏ;SW aﾗヴIWa┌ﾉﾉ┞ H┞ GﾗﾉSゲデWｷﾐぎ ‘く GﾗﾉSゲデWｷﾐが けHｷｪｴ Nﾗﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW Cﾗ┌ヴデ ‘ﾗﾗﾏぎ Aﾐ O┗Wヴ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa デｴW 
Pゲ┞Iｴｷ;デヴｷI E┝ヮWヴデ ;ゲ HｷヴWS G┌ﾐげ ｷﾐ ‘く “ｷﾏﾗﾐ ふWSくぶが Review of Clinical Psychiatry and the Law (American Psychiatric 
Publishing, 1992).  
49 In the UK this was a consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13. 
50 Concerns about perceived partisanship of expert witnesses, and the consequent impact on the scientific 
credibility of their evidence, were voiced regularly from the 1780s onwards. For discussion of these concerns in 
デｴW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa デｴW ヴｷゲW ﾗa デｴW ;S┗Wヴゲ;ヴｷ;ﾉ デヴｷ;ﾉ ゲWW Tく Gﾗﾉ;ﾐが け‘W┗ｷゲｷデｷﾐｪ デｴW Hｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa “IｷWﾐデｷaｷI E┝ヮWヴデ TWゲデｷﾏﾗﾐ┞げ 
(2008) 73 Brooklyn Law Review ΒΑΓき Cく JﾗﾐWゲが けE┝ヮWヴデ WｷデﾐWゲses: Science, Medicine and the Practice of Law 
ふO┝aﾗヴSぎ Cﾉ;ヴWﾐSﾗﾐ PヴWゲゲが ヱΓΓヴぶく Fﾗヴ ; ヴWIWﾐデ ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ ﾗa デｴW ﾉｷデWヴ;デ┌ヴW ゲWW Kく Cﾗ┌┣Wﾐゲが けさUヮﾗﾐ ﾏ┞ ┘ﾗヴSが I Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ 
ゲWW デｴW ┌ゲW ﾗa ﾏWSｷI;ﾉ W┗ｷSWﾐIW ｴWヴWざぎ PWヴゲ┌;ゲｷﾗﾐが A┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ;ﾐS MWSｷI;ﾉ E┝ヮWヴデｷゲW ｷﾐ デｴW ESｷﾐH┌ヴgh High Court 
ﾗa J┌ゲデｷIｷ;ヴ┞げ ふヲヰヱΒぶ ヱヰン History (forthcoming). 
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 It is also important to confront a still more fundamental suspicion than can arise 
HWデ┘WWﾐ ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ﾗﾐW ｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSWS ｷﾐ ﾏｷゲデヴ┌ゲデ ﾗa デｴW ﾗデｴWヴげゲ ﾏWデ;ヮｴ┞ゲｷI;ﾉ 
underpinnings. Neither law nor psychology requires a commitment to drawing a conclusion 
about the ultimate nature of human decision-making, but the disciplines do tend to pull us 
towards different poles of the age-old freedom/determinism debate. If determinism is 
correct, デｴWﾐ ┘W ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ゲWWﾏ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ HW ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHﾉW aﾗヴ ﾗ┌ヴ ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ 
assignment of fault and system of sanctions become difficult to justify. Some philosophers 
have developed sophisticated responses to this concern, including by attacking the idea that 
there is a link between moral responsibility and the freedom to choose an alternate course of 
action.51 For the most part, however, lawyers and legal academics go about their business 
with a sort of loose commitment to libertarianism.52 If pressed on the nature of human 
decision-making, the legally trained may well be non-committal or even express some 
sympathy for the determinist view, but day-to-day we approach the operation of the legal 
system as if the libertarian position were correct.  
Conversely, psychologists are not invariably determinists. There are psychologists who 
defend free will53 and even among the psychologists who would normally be classified as 
determinists we find attempts to carve out space for genuine decision-making.54 
Psychologists working on less abstract questions do not in general need to worry about such 
matters. Like lawyers they can focus on more quotidian concerns. But in their work they tend 
to look for causal explanations for our behaviour: for consumer psychologists this means 
asking how we respond to adverts or to the positioning of goods in a supermarket or to 
incongruent brand messages. This does not require consumer psychologists to conclude that 
                                                          
51 “WWが ﾏﾗゲデ a;ﾏﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞が Hく Fヴ;ﾐﾆa┌ヴデが けAﾉデWヴﾐ;デW PﾗゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS Mﾗヴ;ﾉ ‘WゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞げ ふヱΓヶΓぶ ヶヶ The Journal of 
Philosophy 829. For those with a legal background who do end up engaging with the freedom-determinism 
SWH;デWが “デヴ;┘ゲﾗﾐげゲ Iﾗﾏヮ;デｷHｷﾉｷゲﾏ ﾗaデWﾐ ｴﾗﾉSゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾐゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗W ;デデヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐく Fﾗヴ “デヴ;┘ゲﾗﾐ ﾗ┌ヴ SWゲｷヴW デﾗ ヮ┌ﾐｷゲｴ ｷゲ デｷWS 
デﾗ ﾗ┌ヴ けヴW;Iデｷ┗W ;デデｷデ┌SWゲげ デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ ┘ｷデﾐWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷﾐaﾉｷIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｴ;ヴﾏ ﾗﾐ ﾗデｴWヴゲが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ｷﾐゲWヮ;ヴ;HﾉW aヴﾗﾏ ﾗ┌ヴ 
nature as ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ HWｷﾐｪゲく “WW PくFく “デヴ;┘ゲﾗﾐが けFヴWWSﾗﾏ ;ﾐS ‘WゲWﾐデﾏWﾐデげ ふヱΓヶヲぶ ヴΒ Proceedings of the British 
Academy 187. 
52 Used here in the sense this term is employed in metaphysics, i.e., as involving a commitment to a belief in free 
will and not in the sense this term is used in political philosophy, the latter being much more commonly 
encountered in legal scholarship.     
53 This is true, in particular, of humanist psychologists such as Carl Rogers. 
54 Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ﾗﾐ ゲﾗﾏW ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ﾗa FヴW┌Sげゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆ デｴW ｪﾗ;ﾉ ﾗa ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗ;nalysis is to provide subjects with some 
ability to control their actions.     
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┘W ;ヴW けP;┗ﾉﾗ┗ｷ;ﾐ ゲデﾗﾗｪWぷゲへ ﾗa デｴW ;S┗Wヴデｷゲｷﾐｪ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞げが55 but in their day-to-day work they 
look at psychological processes through a lens of soft determinism.        
 Lawyers and psychologists thus tend to look at the world and its inhabitants from 
different perspectives, at least in their day-to-day dealings. This can make lawyers wary of 
accommodating insights from psychology. This is particularly true in cases where 
psychological evidence may cast doubt on human agency,56 as some consumer psychology 
might seem to tend towards. The law has far less difficulty in accommodating insights from 
psychologists in other types of case, for example, in family court proceedings where 
psychological evidence will go more to matters of environment, as where the question is 
whether a child would be more likely to flourish in one domestic situation rather than 
another.57 This is not to suggest that there would be an insurmountable obstacle to making 
greater use of psychological evidence on the types of matters that arise in trade mark cases.58 
But the metaphysical mistrust that can arise between the disciplines means that there is an 
even heavier burden on proponents of greater engagement between the disciplines than 
might be suggested by the other consideration canvassed in this section alone (cost, the need 
to preserve judicial discretion, the problem of testing for likelihood of confusion in a robust 
fashion, and the problems with expert evidence generally).    
 
IV. TOWARDS A NEW RELATIONSHIP 
The analysis presented thus far demonstrates that psychology and trade mark law make much 
less comfortable bedfellows than might at first be imagined. It is clear that any attempt to 
build a more fruitful relationship between the two disciplines needs to take account of a range 
of potential obstacles. It also seems that the most productive way forward is likely to be to 
find areas when consensus might be achieved relatively easily, rather than, say, trying to 
                                                          
55 Bく BWWHWが け“W;ヴIｴ ;ﾐS PWヴゲ┌;ゲｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ L;┘げ ふヲヰヰヵぶ ヱヰン Michigan Law Review 2020, 2023. 
56 For a discussion of the hostility of English courts to psychological evidence in the criminal context see A. 
Cﾗﾉﾏ;ﾐ ;ﾐS ‘く M;IK;┞が けPゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ E┗ｷSWﾐIW ｷﾐ Cﾗ┌ヴデぎ LWｪ;ﾉ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデゲ ｷﾐ Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐS ;ﾐS デｴW UﾐｷデWS “デ;デWゲげ 
(1995) 1 Psychology, Crime and Law ヲヶヱ ふﾐﾗデｷﾐｪ けIﾐ Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSが デｴW ｪヴﾗ┘デｴ ﾗa ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;aデWヴ デｴW “WIﾗﾐS WﾗヴﾉS 
War was accompanied by an increasingly sceptical and cautious attitude on the part of the judiciary towards the 
;SﾏｷゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ヮゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ W┗ｷSWﾐIWげ ふ;デ ヲヶヱぶぶく 
57 Although here, too, there is debate: see Jく C;ゲｴﾏﾗヴW ;ﾐS Pく P;ヴﾆｷﾐゲﾗﾐ けTｴW UゲW ;ﾐS AH┌ゲW ﾗa “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ Science 
‘WゲW;ヴIｴ E┗ｷSWﾐIW ｷﾐ CｴｷﾉSヴWﾐろゲ C;ゲWゲげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ヲヰ Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 239. 
58 As illustrated by the fact that the criminal justice system has come to accommodate insights from 
psychologists, for example, in risk assessments made as part of parole decisions, although even in this case it 
might be noted that in both legal circles and press coverage there is a tendency to treat such insights as going 
to the question of whether the prisoner is likely to choose to reoffend.  
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reach immediate agreement on how to incorporate survey evidence into the likelihood of 
confusion enquiry. It seemed to us that a useful first step might be to see whether we might 
try to think about the relationship between the two disciplines at a higher level of abstraction. 
Rather than thinking about how psychology might influence the outcome in a particular 
dispute, we might want to think about whether we can learn anything from psychology at a 
more general level.    
 Consider, for example, old British rules on comparison of marks, rules that continue 
to be influential in a number of Commonwealth countries. These tell us, for example, that 
words are more likely to be deemed similar if they share the same beginning rather than the 
same ending.59 Conversely, word marks are less likely to be deemed similar if they contain a 
different number of syllables.60 At the danger of stating the obvious, these rules are not 
intended to act as a closed set of legal rules. Courts are not making an assessment of whether 
the signs are similar solely by reference to an established body of case law. Rather they are 
seeking to establish whether the marks share enough features in common that they would 
be likely to leave consumers with the same overall impression. It is for this reason that when 
making assessments of similarity we pay attention to the conditions under which goods and 
services are offered to the public. If we are talking about marks for beer, for example, we 
need to take account of the fact that beer is sold in noisy bars where there is a significant 
danger of mishearing.61    
Rules on comparison of marks are thus at their heart rules on how consumers respond 
to things they see and hear, what they are likely to retain and what sort of connections they 
are likely to draw. But looked at in this way it soon becomes clear that the rules rest on a 
series of untested assumptions. They are, in essence, the product of early twentieth century 
judicial guesswork. If that seems likely an unduly harsh assessment, we should acknowledge 
that the present authors have not been above guesswork of their own. For instance, we 
became concerned that Australian courts had underplayed the potential importance of 
ideational similarity. This is because they had held that a finding of deceptive similarity could 
not be made on the basis of ideational similarity alone.62 This meant, for example, that a mark 
                                                          
59 London Lubricaﾐデゲ ふヱΓヲヰぶ LデSげゲ AヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ (1925) 42 RPC 264 (CA) is usually cited as the foundational case.  
60 See, e.g., RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co v Butland Tobacco Ltd [1974] NZIPOTM 1; けL;ﾐIWヴげ Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ [1987] RPC 
303 (Ch); Gardenia Overseas Pte Ltd v The Garden Co Ltd (1994) 29 IPR 485 (FCA).  
61 NW┘ )W;ﾉ;ﾐS BヴW┘WヴｷWゲ LデS ┗ HWｷﾐWﾆWﾐげゲ BｷWヴ Bヴﾗ┘Wヴｷﾃ M;;デゲIｴ;ヮヮｷﾃ NV [1964] NZLR 115, 136 (NZCA). 
62 Sports Cafe Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 42 IPR 552, 557 (FFCA).  
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featuring the image of a star could not be regarded as deceptively similar to a mark featuring 
デｴW ┘ﾗヴS けゲデ;ヴげく Iデ ゲWWﾏWS デﾗ ┌ゲ デｴ;デ デｴｷゲ a;ｷﾉWS デﾗ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲW デｴ;デ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ ﾏｷｪｴデ HW ﾉWaデ ┘ｷデｴ 
the idea or impression of a star and hence mistake the two. One of the present authors 
pointed out that Australian courts had failed to consider late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century UK cases that had reached the opposite conclusion63 and, of course, was delighted 
when the Full Federal Court signalled a shift in its position.64 But if we are being honest, the 
argument rested on a guess that the guess made by UK courts was better than the guess made 
by Australian courts a century later. 
If our rules on comparison of marks are a product of guesswork, there must surely be 
scope for psychology to add something important, if only in terms of us getting a better 
understanding of how consumers process information. Think about what we know about the 
rearrangement of internal word order. Several years ago, the so-I;ﾉﾉWS けC;ﾏHヴｷSｪW Wﾏ;ｷﾉげ ┘;ゲ 
┘ｷSWﾉ┞ IｷヴI┌ﾉ;デWSく Tｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ ｷﾐデWﾐSWS デﾗ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デW デｴ;デ けｷデ SWﾗゲﾐげデ ﾏデデ;Wヴ ｷﾐ ┘;ｴデ ﾗヴWSヴ デｴW 
ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist and lsat ltteer be at the rghit 
ヮIﾉ;Wげく “┌HゲWケ┌Wﾐデ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ｴ;ゲ IﾗﾐaｷヴﾏWS デｴ;デ ┘ｴWヴW ; ┘ﾗヴS ｷゲ ヴWヮヴﾗS┌IWS ┘ｷデｴ ｷデゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ 
letters mixed up we can often still match that word against its normal orthographic 
representation stored in our memory.65 Operationalising this knowledge within the trade 
mark system would almost certainly make very little difference to the outcome in most cases. 
Courts would tend towards a finding of similarity in jumbled word cases applying current 
rules. Moreover, we need, as always, to be clear about the limits of scientific knowledge: we 
;ヴW ゲデｷﾉﾉ ﾐﾗデ WﾐデｷヴWﾉ┞ IﾉW;ヴ ┘ｴ┞ ﾏﾗゲデ ﾗa ┌ゲ aｷﾐS ｷデ ｴ;ヴSWヴ デﾗ ヴW;S けBｷｪ II┌ﾐﾗｷﾉ デ;┝ ｷﾐWWゲ;Iヴゲげ ;ゲ 
けHｷｪ Iﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ デ;┝ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWゲげ デｴ;ﾐ ┘W Sﾗ デﾗ ヴW;S けA ┗ｴWIﾉｷW Wヮ┝ﾉWSﾗS ;デ ; ヮﾉﾗIｷW IWｴIﾆｷヮﾗﾐデげ ;ゲ けA 
vehicle exploded ;デ ; ヮﾗﾉｷIW IｴWIﾆヮﾗｷﾐデげく66  
Nevertheless, a better understanding of how consumers access and process 
information would allow us to be more confident about outcomes, particularly in cases that 
are genuinely difficult or borderline. For example, a better understanding of the lessons that 
                                                          
63 Specifically, La Société Anonyme des Verreries dW ﾉげEデﾗｷﾉWげゲ Tヴ;SW M;ヴﾆ (1894) 11 RPC 142 (CA); Pﾗﾏヴｷﾉ LデSげゲ 
Application (1901) 18 RPC 181 (Ch). See R. Burrell and M. Handler, Australian Trade Mark Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 182-184 
64 In Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156.  
65 Kく ‘;┞ﾐWヴが “くJく WｴｷデWが ‘くLく Jﾗｴﾐゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS “くPく Lｷ┗WヴゲWSｪWが け‘;WSｷﾐｪ WヴﾗSゲ ┘ｷデｴ J┌HﾏﾉWS LWデデヴWゲぎ TｴWヴW ｷゲ ; Iﾗゲデげ 
(2006) 17 Psychological Science ヱΓヲ ;ﾐS “くJく L┌ヮﾆWヴが Mく PWヴW; ;ﾐS CくJく D;┗ｷゲが けTヴ;ﾐゲヮﾗゲWS-letter Effects: 
Cﾗﾐゲﾗﾐ;ﾐデゲが ┗ﾗ┘Wﾉゲ ;ﾐS ﾉWデデWヴ aヴWケ┌WﾐI┞げ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ヲン Language and Cognitive Processes 93. 
66 These examples are adapted from the webpages of the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit at the University of 
Cambridge: mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/people/matt.davis/cmabridge.  
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psychology has to offer might allow us to be more confident about whether the VOLVO / 
LOVOL dispute was rightly decided.67 Embedding insights from psychology into some of our 
legal tests would also ensure that tribunals could deal more confidently with attempts by 
parties to rely on arguments grounded in psychological studies. It would remove the sense 
that tribunals are uncomfortable or perhaps even unduly defensive when addressing such 
arguments.68     
Building the sort of relationship we have in mind is obviously a slow process. It requires 
us to think carefully about when and how psychology might have something to offer. It also 
requires thinking about the mechanism(s) or route(s) by which insights might be embedded: 
one thing we do not address in this paper is when work in psychology could make its way into 
legal tests via adoption by courts, by a more indirect route through, say, discussion in 
academic treatises, or via other trade mark institutions such as the trade mark office. These 
are hard questions, as the earlier discussion of expert evidence illustrates. But before we can 
even think about such paths to change, it also requires psychologists to design studies that 
produce results that are meaningful, bearing in mind that the findings need to be capable of 
taking root in the artificial trade mark ecosystem we have constructed. The team of 
psychologists with whom the present authors have been working have made a start on the 
latter process, conducting three studies that help shed light on some of the most important 
issues in trade mark law. These are discussed immediately below.69  
 
(a) Getting started  
In our view one important place to start was with the basic rules for comparing word marks. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the rules that is still widely applied in Commonwealth countries 
is that the beginning of words is more important than the end and, in particular, that attention 
                                                          
67 T-525/11 - Volvo Trademark v OHMI - Hebei Aulion Heavy Industries (12 November 2014) (General Court of 
デｴW E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Uﾐｷﾗﾐが ヴWﾃWIデｷﾐｪ Vﾗﾉ┗ﾗげゲ ;ヮヮW;ﾉ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ OHIMげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ LOVOL デﾗ HW ヴWｪｷゲデWヴWSぶき Volvo 
Trademark Holding AB v Hebei Aulion Heavy Industries Co Ltd [2009] ATMO 46 (Australian registry, rejecting 
Volvﾗげゲ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐぶく  
68 See, in particular, Volvo v OHMI, ibid, [49]. Volvo argued that research from cognitive neuroscience suggested 
that consumers would associate the marks such that they ought to be regarded as similar. The General Court 
dismissed this argument without engaging with the science or the relevant policy considerations on the ground 
デｴ;デ Vﾗﾉ┗ﾗげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ け┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ ;ﾐ┞ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS H┞ I;ゲW-ﾉ;┘げく “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ Lion-Beer, Spirits & 
Wine Pty Ltd v Harvey [2013] ATMO 6 (Australian registry SW;ﾉｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ ゲﾗﾏW ﾗa デｴW W┗ｷSWﾐIW ﾗﾐ けﾃ┌ﾏHﾉWS ┘ﾗヴSゲげ 
outlined above).    
69 Inevitably, it is not possible to provide a detailed account of the methodology or experimental design of these 
studies. For these the reader should refer to the original studies.  
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should be given to the first syllable.70 Although this rule has been with us for nearly a century, 
it is not underpinned by any empirical evidence. Moreover, when this rule is explored in 
further detail the internal rationale for this rule becomes somewhat unclear. Originally this 
;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ┘;ゲ ﾃ┌ゲデｷaｷWS HWI;┌ゲW ﾗa けthe tendency of persons using the English language to slur 
デｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ┘ﾗヴSゲげく B┌デ デｴｷゲ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ｷゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ;┌ヴ;ﾉ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ: it is a 
concern that goes to the danger of mishearing as might occur when a product is ordered over 
the telephone or by talking to a shop assistant. However, this rule has been equally applied 
in cases where aural comparison is of relatively little importance because the goods in 
question will only ever be selected by the consumer from a rack or a shelf or from an online 
store. Indeed, tribunals in Australia have been clear that for many products aural similarity is 
retreating in importance as shopping habits change, and yet they continue to apply London 
Lubricants.71  
This suggests that there must be another justification for the rule, namely, that it is 
the start of a word that will leave the greatest impression with consumers.72 If this is correct, 
then there may well be a greater danger of confusion (because of imperfect recollection) if a 
later market entrant chooses a mark with a similar beginning than there is if the later entrant 
chooses a mark whose similarities lie in some other component.   
 Designing a test to seek to establish whether consumers really are more likely to be 
confused by similar word beginnings is, however, difficult. Replicating shopping scenarios is 
hard and is not necessarily helpful if one is talking about comparing marks for the purposes 
of the abstract test used in the registered trade mark system which requires us to consider 
the mark as registered not as used に and in some cases even before there is any use. 
Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect that if consumers do pay more attention to the 
beginning of words this would be something they would be aware of subjectively. In other 
words, if the legal test accurately reflects consumer response one would expect that if you 
ask members of the public to rate the similarity of words they would tend to focus on the 
                                                          
70 In re London Lubricants [1925] 42 RPC 264. 
71 See, e.g., Taiwan Yamani Inc v Giorgio Armani SpA (1989) 17 IPR 92(ATMO). To much the same effect, see 
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, Trade Mark Work Manual, p. 18 (Version 5, June 2017), available at: 
https://www.ipos.gov.sg/docs/default-source/resources-library/trade-marks/infopacks/tm_work-manual_7-
relative-grounds_jun2017.pdfく Iデ ｷゲが ﾗa Iﾗ┌ヴゲWが ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW デｴ;デ デｴW ;S┗Wﾐデ ﾗa けｷﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐデ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ゲゲｷゲデ;ﾐデゲげ ゲ┌Iｴ 
as Siri will cause a resurgence in the importance of aural similarity.  
72 Perhaps, for example, because we are accustomed to reading left to right. Our thanks go to Richard Arnold for 
emphasising this point.  
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beginnings as being the most important feature. A critic might respond that the additional 
propensity for confusion occurs by means of a purely subconscious process. But if we were to 
approach the matter de novo we would require the critic to prove this subconscious effect. 
As a practical matter, of course, we cannot approach this question as if we were starting with 
a blank sheet of paper に any shift from the current rule would create considerable uncertainty 
and thus could only be justified by cogent evidence. However, for the purpose of working out 
how the disciplines might learn to speak to one another, we should try to approach questions 
ﾉｷﾆW けゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ┘W ┘Wｷｪｴ ┘ﾗヴS HWｪｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪゲ ﾏﾗヴW ｴW;┗ｷﾉ┞いげ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ ﾗヮWﾐ ﾏｷﾐSく   
 The psychologists in the research team therefore conducted a laboratory study where 
they asked participants to rate the similarity of words, being a mixture of words from the 
dictionary and brand names taken from the Australian trade marks register.73 The participants 
were asked to rate on a short numerical scale the similarity of the words presented to them 
visually. They were instructed that they should consider whether the words might be 
confused when reading, but were given few other instructions and no information about 
pronunciation or the like. The idea was that this experiment would give us an indication of 
whether there was anything in the subjective response of participants to support the idea 
that we should give additional weight to the beginnings of words even when we are 
concerned solely with visual (as opposed to aural) presentation. The results were striking: 
participants gave a much higher similarity score to words that shared the same beginning 
than they did to words that shared the same ending.74  
 This first experiment does not, of course, demonstrate that the current legal test is 
correct. The test tells us nothing about memory effects and hence the likelihood of confusion. 
But it does tell us something about how we process words, it does suggest that we do respond 
much more strongly to the beginnings of words than to their endings or other elements. As 
such it lends some weight to the view that the current rule is appropriate.  
Beyond this though the study may offer a further important lesson for trade mark law. 
The results of the study were extremely consistent. It seems that as soon as you have a 
moderately sized group of 20 or (somewhat mischievously) we might suggest 12, then you 
                                                          
73 “WW JWﾐﾐｷaWヴ “く B┌ヴデが Kく MIF;ヴﾉ;ﾐWが “く KWﾉﾉ┞が Mく H┌ﾏヮｴヴW┞ゲが Kく WW;デｴWヴ;ﾉﾉ ;ﾐS ‘く B┌ヴヴWﾉﾉが けBヴ;ﾐS N;ﾏW 
Cﾗﾐa┌ゲｷﾗﾐぎ “┌HﾃWIデｷ┗W ;ﾐS OHﾃWIデｷ┗W MW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa Oヴデｴﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷI “ｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴｷデ┞げ ふヲヰヱΑぶ ヲン Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied 320.  
74 The results are not easily summarised since they varied across various sub-experiments that tested for the 
impact of different length letter strings, the importance of vowel match, etc.  
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can be fairly certain that assessments of similarity across the group will map onto the reaction 
of a much larger group. However, when looking at the response of any given individual we do 
often find some idiosyncratic assessments. This might cause us to reflect on whether we are 
confident that the training, experience and shared understandings of trade mark examiners, 
hearing officers and judges is sufficient to counteract any personal tendency towards unusual 
views of similarity. More controversially, we might want to ask whether we want to pay more 
attention to public ratings of similarity, and if so, how might this be done. Assuming that no 
one really wants to revert to having jury trials in trade mark cases,75 does this perhaps mean 
that experimental data of the type our study produced might be admitted, or does it mean 
that we might use a more statistical measure of similarity? Our study suggests, for example, 
that it would possible to design a metric based on existing metrics used in psychology or other 
disciplines that would provide a reliable indicator of whether the public would be likely to 
regard two words as similar.76 Such a measure may or may not be useful, and we would 
certainly never suggest that it could be definitive, because as we have already noted we need 
to leave room for judicial discretion including to take account of conditions in particular 
trades, competition concerns (such as concerns to keep certain kinds of words available for 
all to use) and the like. But we do think that it is an idea that is at least worth considering.  
 
(b) Limping towards confusion 
The second study was designed to think about issues of distinctiveness, but in a somewhat 
different way than one might normally expect this issue to be tackled. The problem with 
studies that ask consumers whether they respond to this sign or that sign as a badge of origin 
is that they readily lapse into asking what looks like leading questions. The concern is that if 
┞ﾗ┌ ;ゲﾆ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ; ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ ﾉｷﾆW け┘ｴﾗ Sﾗ ┞ﾗ┌ デｴｷﾐﾆ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ デｴｷゲ ゲｴﾗWげ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ ; ヮｷIデ┌ヴW ﾗa 
a shoe with a series of stripes on the side, you are signalling to the respondent that they have 
enough information to answer the question, you are encouraging them to speculate. Drawing 
                                                          
75 For a discussion (and bipartisan rejection) of this possibility, see Verrocchi v Direct Chemist Outlet (2015) 228 
FCR 189 at [316]に[326]. 
76 Burt et al supra ﾐ ヲく WW ;ヴW IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲ ﾗa Dｷﾐ┘ﾗﾗSｷW ;ﾐS G;ﾐｪﾃWWげゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ デｴ;デ けconsumer reaction might be 
deduced using heuristic devices designed to short-circuit the factually intensive and messy enquiry into how real 
┘ﾗヴﾉS Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ ヮWヴIWｷ┗W ゲｷｪﾐゲげぎ supra n 3, 365. As noted, we would not argue that any such heuristic 
or metric should be determinative of the questions in trade mark law. The point here, too, is that by drawing on 
experiments like that reported here, we can ensure the heuristic is rooted in empirical evidence, rather than 
judicial (or other) guesswork. 
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on the general principles of good survey design you could perhaps administer a written 
ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐﾐ;ｷヴW ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ けI Sﾗﾐげデ ﾆﾐﾗ┘げ Hﾗ┝ ;ゲ ﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴW ;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗Wゲが H┌デ W┗Wﾐ ﾗﾐ デｴｷゲ ﾏﾗSWﾉ 
you have still asked them to speculate as to trade origin when this idea might simply not have 
entered their mind at all.  Semi-structured interview questions, where there is scope for the 
researcher to ask for clarification on certain points might be an alternative, but there is still 
the danger of leading respondents towards certain answers. Consequently, there are good 
ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴｷﾐｪ けSｷゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ゲげ ┘ｷデｴ I;┌デｷﾗﾐく77 
 We therefore thought that an alternative approach might be to work backwards from 
what we can deduce about the signs that consumers rely on when they are searching for 
products. In order to test this, we presented participants in our second study with a group of 
brands and accompanying brand claims or slogans.78 The brands used were all existing 
Australian brands that enjoy a significant market share and in the preliminary phase we 
ensured that participants were familiar with the brands in question. These brands were then 
matched with a slogan generated by the research team. Participants were instructed to try to 
remember the brand and the slogan, and were told that they would be tested on the 
recurrence of the brand with the slogan. During the memory phase of the test participants 
were shown a number of pairs, some were pairs they had studied, some consisted of slogans 
they had studied linked to a new brand in the same product category and some consisted of 
slogans they had studied linked to a new brand in a different product category. So, for 
W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ﾏｷｪｴデ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ;ゲﾆWS デﾗ ゲデ┌S┞ けAﾉ┘;┞ゲ ヴWﾉｷ;HﾉW ┘ｷデｴぐ E┗WヴW;S┞げく “ﾗﾏW 
┘ﾗ┌ﾉS デｴWﾐ HW ゲｴﾗ┘ﾐ けAﾉ┘;┞ゲ ヴWﾉｷ;HﾉW ┘ｷデｴぐE┗WヴW;S┞げが ゲﾗﾏW ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ゲｴﾗ┘ﾐ けAﾉ┘;┞ゲ ヴWﾉｷ;HﾉW 
┘ｷデｴぐD┌ヴ;IWﾉﾉげ ;ﾐS ゲﾗﾏW ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ゲｴﾗ┘ﾐ けAﾉ┘;┞ゲ ヴWﾉｷ;HﾉW ┘ｷデｴぐH┌ｪｪｷWゲげく TｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ aﾗ┌ﾐS 
; ゲデ;デｷゲデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW ｷﾐ デｴW けa;ﾉゲW ;ﾉ;ヴﾏ ヴ;デWげ ┘ｴWﾐ ; ゲデ┌SｷWS ゲﾉﾗｪ;ﾐ ┘;ゲ ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ 
conjunction with a brand in the same product category, compared to when it was used in 
relation to a brand in a different product category. In other words, there was something about 
the slogans that meant they became attached in the minds of the participants to a particular 
type of product.  
                                                          
77 This is notable because surveys regarding distinctiveness are often treated as less problematic than surveys 
targeted at testing for consumer confusion: Dinwoodie and Gangjee supra n 3; Weatherall supra n 2.  
78 Mく H┌ﾏヮｴヴW┞ゲが Kく MIF;ヴﾉ;ﾐWが Jく B┌ヴデが “く KWﾉﾉ┞が Kく WW;デｴWヴ;ﾉﾉ ;ﾐS ‘く B┌ヴヴWﾉﾉが け‘WIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ CﾗﾐデW┝デぎ 
IﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ デヴ;SW ﾏ;ヴﾆ ﾉ;┘げ ふヲヰヱΑぶ ヲヴ Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1665. 
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 Wｴ;デ SﾗWゲ デｴｷゲ デWﾉﾉ ┌ゲい A ゲIWヮデｷI ｷゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐS けﾐﾗデｴｷﾐｪげく OﾐW ﾗH┗ｷﾗ┌ゲ IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏ ｷゲ 
that our study is far removed from a high-fidelity shopping scenario. However, if we try and 
step back from what we do at the moment and reflect on what we know about the impact of 
slogans on consumers, then we might see our study as providing some limited evidence that 
consumers do rapidly associate slogans with particular types of product. Might this not 
suggest that if we allow competitors within the same product category to copy slogans this is 
likely to lead to confusion? Does this in turn raise questions about the registrability of slogans: 
in particular, is it right to treat sloganゲ ﾉWゲゲ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ;Hﾉ┞ HWI;┌ゲW デｴW┞ ;ヴW けﾉｷﾏヮｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆゲげ? On 
this view, although consumers may associate slogans with particular traders, they do not rely 
ﾗﾐ デｴWﾏ デﾗ aｷﾐS デｴW ヮヴﾗS┌Iデゲ デｴW┞ ┘;ﾐデぎ デｴW┞ ﾏ;┞ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デW けH;┗W ; BヴW;ﾆげ ┘ｷデｴ NWゲデﾉWが H┌デ 
no one ever went ｷﾐデﾗ ; ゲｴﾗヮ ;ﾐS ゲ;ｷS けヮﾉW;ゲW ﾏ;┞ I ｴ;┗W ; H;┗W ; BヴW;ﾆげ: rather, they ask for 
a Kit Kat. However, looked at from an infringement perspective, this approach to 
distinctiveness looks somewhat suspect. In Australia at least, when thinking about 
infringement we focus on matters of first impression. We focus on a consumer who has had 
limited exposure to the senior mark, so that their recollection of it may be imperfect, and who 
encounters the junior mark for the first time. Now let us change our focus slightly and think 
about the real-world scenario of a consumer who encounters a product for the first time. If 
we accept that slogans can become readily attached to a product then consumers may to 
some degree rely on slogans to help them make purchases に at least until the primary brand 
name is firmly fixed in their minds. Viewed in this way it is much less clear that slogans should 
be dismissed as mere limping marks, unless of course we were prepared to abandon our 
concern with matters of first impression generally.  
If our second study suggests that consumers might rely on slogans when making 
purchasing decisions then we also need to ask questions about other secondary indicators of 
source, above all trade dress. This formed the focus of our final study.      
 
(c) Looking like confusion 
The third topic we wanted to examine was lookalike products. This was an obvious area to 
explore because lookalike goods have been controversial for many years and brand owners 
periodically insist that more needs to be done to protect them from copycat products. It was 
also one that seemed potentially fruitful, since the question of how we think about product 
get up is important both in terms of what we let onto the register and in terms of passing off 
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litigation. At the same time, it is an issue that needs to be approached with care, because 
protection for product get up, much more than protection for some other secondary 
indicators of source, raises very real competition concerns.   
 In Commonwealth countries brand owners have generally struggled to prevent the 
sale of lookalike products. The assumption is that consumers pay more attention to brand 
names than they do to product appearance when making their purchasing decisions. In fact, 
the law has not really moved on since the 1903 decision in Schweppes Ltd v Gibbens,79 where 
LﾗヴS H;ﾉゲH┌ヴ┞ ゲ;ｷSが けｷa ; ヮWヴゲﾗﾐ ｷゲ ゲﾗ I;ヴWﾉWゲゲ デｴ;デ ｴW SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ﾉﾗﾗﾆが ;ﾐS SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデぐ さデヴW;デ デｴW 
ﾉ;HWﾉ a;ｷヴﾉ┞ざが H┌デ デ;ﾆWゲ デｴW HﾗデデﾉW ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ ゲ┌aaｷIｷWﾐデ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ ヴW;Sｷﾐｪ ┘ｴ;デ 
is written very plainly indeed upon the face of the label on which the trader has placed his 
ﾗ┘ﾐ ﾐ;ﾏWが デｴWﾐ ┞ﾗ┌ IWヴデ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ I;ﾐﾐﾗデ ゲ;┞ ｴW ｷゲ SWIWｷ┗WSげく80  
 We set out to test whether consumers really do treat the relationship between brand 
names and labels / packaging in the way Lord Halsbury suggests: is it really only exceptionally 
careless consumers who can be led into error by similarities in packaging? The psychologists 
in the research team therefore designed another memory experiment in which participants 
were asked to remember pictures of a number of items all of a type that could be found in a 
supermarket.81 During the recall part of the experiment the products were manipulated so 
that one group of subjects was presented with identical packaging and a similar brand name 
(e.g. Heinz and Heanz) and another group of subjects was presented with identical packaging 
;ﾐS ; Sｷゲゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴ Hヴ;ﾐS ﾐ;ﾏW ふWくｪく HWｷﾐ┣ ;ﾐS BWヴデｷWげゲぶく Ia ﾗ┌ヴ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗヮWﾐゲｷデ┞ ;ゲ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ 
really is to focus on brand names then one would expect very different false alarm rates 
between the two groups: we would expect a much higher false alarm rate from the identical 
packaging, similar brand group than from the identical packaging, dissimilar brand group. In 
fact, however, the false alarm rates between the two groups were almost identical.  
 There are lots of things that this study does not tell us. It does not, for example, tell us 
how fame will impact on the relative weight that we place on brand names. The experiment 
tested whether participants had seen a product before during the study. In contrast, a 
consumer may be seeking to find a product that they may have encountered on many 
                                                          
79 (1905) 22 RPC 601. The quote is at pp. 606-7.  
80 For the ongoing influence of Schweppes Ltd v Gibbens see, e.g, George East Housewares Ltd v Fackelmann 
Gmbh & Co KG [2016] EWHC 2476 (IPEC).  
81 M. Humphreys, K. McFarlane, J. Burt, S. Kelly, K. Weatherall and R. Burrellが けHﾗ┘ Iﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ｷゲ デｴW N;ﾏW ｷﾐ 
Predicting False Recognition for Lookalike Brands? (2017) 23 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 381.  
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previous occasions. Perhaps as brand names become very firmly fixed in our mind we become 
less susceptible to the impact of similar packaging. Perhaps the participants in our study 
began to doubt their recollection of the name and began to focus unduly on trying to 
remember the details of the packaging they had seen in a way that would not map onto a real 
shopping scenario. Perhaps the fact that the experiment turned on our judgment calls as to 
whether the marks were similar or dissimilar brings our results into question. These and 
similar arguments might all form avenues by which to protect the status quo.  
 If, however, one steps back from the current legal position would it really be all that 
surprising if our study provided some evidence to suggest that confusion might be occurring? 
Might the prevalence of copycat strategies not indicate that traders are quietly hoping that 
some degree of confusion will occur,82 even if they might also have other reasons for adopting 
such a strategy? Moreover, we would push back against the idea that our experiment has no 
bearing on real shopping scenarios. On the contrary, we would suggest that it provides a 
reasonable proxy for the type of scenario alluded to at the end of the preceding subsection, 
namely, that of a consumer who has had some prior exposure to a brand, but where that 
exposure is sufficiently limited that her memory is imperfect. Take, for instance, someone 
who has tried a new Hヴ;ﾐS ﾗa ｷIW IヴW;ﾏ ;デ ; aヴｷWﾐSげゲ ｴﾗ┌ゲWく Tｴｷゲ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐ SWIｷSWゲ デｴ;デ ゲｴW ┘ｷﾉﾉ 
buy a carton for herself when she sees it for sale and so she tries to commit the product to 
memory. Once she is out shopping our study suggests similarity of get up may be enough to 
cause her to buy the wrong brand, even if the brand names are entirely different. If the 
confusion had arisen because of similarity in the brand names this would be treated as a 
straightforward case. We therefore need to think harder about whether, and if so why, the 
result should be different if the error is caused by similarity of packaging.  
 Consequently, although our study unquestionably has its limits, it does call into 
question our restrictive attitude to allowing similarity of trade dress to form the basis of a 
successful passing off claim and to allowing elements of product design to be registered as a 
                                                          
82 This would include cases (possibly the majority) where the later market entrant is hoping not so much for an 
increase in sales through ongoing confusion involving repeated transactions with the same consumer, but more 
that the consumer will be confused at the point of sale the first time they encounter the copycat product. The 
copyist may well be expecting (indeed hoping) that the consumer will realise his or her error at or before the 
point of consumption, but if they are nevertheless satisfied with the product they may come to accept it as a 
substitute and actively seek it out again. For trade mark lawyers this sort of strategy is traditionally regarded as 
illegitimate, even though it might be defended as competition enhancing.  This speaks to the need of trade mark 
lawyers to speak to other disciplines beyond psychology, a point to which we return below.    
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trade mark. Our tentative findings do not, however, necessarily mean that the law has to 
change, or even that such a decision is merely waiting on further data to confirm our results. 
If packaging is more important in consumer decision-making than we have generally been 
comfortable in admitting, it is likely because we are worried about the impact of greater 
protection on competitors. Such concerns are not without foundation. The supply of 
commercially viable shapes and colours is limited, and perhaps it is more efficient to err on 
the side of allowing some degree of confusion to occur.83 Perhaps we need to give more 
weight to the argument に which receives some support from the marketing literature に that 
lookalike packaging can be a helpful way of signalling functional equivalence. Perhaps it is 
better that any error cost should fall on consumers who に on the assumption they eventually 
realise their error に will be motivated to be more careful next time. Perhaps we need to expect 
a higher degree of attention from customers generally, irrespective of whether we are talking 
about confusion caused by similarity of names or packaging.  
Demanding that consumers be more attentive and worrying less about what the 
けﾏﾗヴﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ; ｴ┌ヴヴ┞げ ﾏｷｪｴデ Sﾗ ﾏｷｪｴデが ﾏﾗヴWﾗ┗Wヴが ｴ;┗W ﾗデｴWヴ ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪWゲく Iデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉSが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが 
allow for greater co-existence between marks generally, an outcome that would by no means 
be unattractive if, as Beebe and Fromer suggest, we may be entering a world in which we are 
けヴ┌ﾐﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗ┌デ ﾗa ﾏ;ヴﾆゲげぎ デｷｪｴデWﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗ┌ヴ ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ﾗﾐ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴｷデ┞ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW デｴW ゲデﾗIﾆ ﾗa ;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW 
marks considerably.84 But considering whether such a development would be desirable is 
precisely why, on the one hand, it is important that as trade mark lawyers we engage with 
other disciplines, whilst, on the other hand, bearing in mind the limits of what other 
disciplines can teach us. Psychologists should hopefully be able to help us predict the likely 
impact of any tightening of our rules on similarity, but they cannot tell us normatively whether 
the consequences of any such tightening would be desirable. This is not to say that the latter 
question is one for trade mark lawyers alone に economists should have at least as much to 
offer. This brings us to a general point. We are not suggesting for a moment that psychology 
is the only other discipline that has something to offer trade mark law or that its insights 
                                                          
83 See Burrell and Handler, supra n 7, pp. 68-69 (where we seek to demonstrate that the supply of bottle shapes 
ｷﾐ Cﾉ;ゲゲ ンヲ ふ;ﾉIﾗｴﾗﾉｷI HW┗Wヴ;ｪWゲぶ ｷゲ ﾉｷﾏｷデWSく Fﾗヴ ; Iﾗﾐデヴ;ヴ┞ ┗ｷW┘ ゲWW Jく MIC┌デIｴWﾗﾐが けMﾗﾐﾗヮﾗﾉｷゲWS PヴﾗS┌Iデ “ｴ;ヮWゲ 
and Factual Distinctiveness under s 41(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (2004) 15 Australian Intellectual 
Property Journal 18, 27-ヲΓ ふSﾗ┌Hデｷﾐｪ デｴW けﾉｷﾏｷデWS ゲ┌ヮヮﾉ┞げ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデぶく     
84 Bく BWWHW ;ﾐS Jく FヴﾗﾏWヴが けAヴW WW ‘┌ﾐﾐｷﾐｪ O┌デ ﾗa Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆゲい Aﾐ EﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ “デ┌S┞ ﾗa Tヴ;SWﾏ;ヴﾆ DWヮﾉWデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS 
CﾗﾐｪWゲデｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヱΒぶ ヱンヱ Harvard Law Review 945. 
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should carry special weight. But we do think that given how much psychology might have to 
teach us it has been woefully neglected thus far, something that cannot be said of economics.  
  
V. CONCLUSION  
To conclude, we would like to return to the question of where trade mark law and psychology 
can meet productively. Where we are running into difficulty at present is in seeing this 
question in terms of whether psychology can help us determine how a particular case should 
be decided. How should this dispute, between these parties, be resolved? Cognitive 
psychology is not well-suited to answering that sort of question. As a discipline it does not set 
out to draw conclusions at that level of specificity. Scientific papers do not try to draw 
conclusions for the single case. They are probabilistic in their approach and insofar as they 
advance our understanding of the real world, they do so by performing experiments in closed 
environments that can only, at best, approximate to real world conditions. Making decisions 
about the individual case in all its complicated, real world messiness is what judges are trained 
to do. It is what legal decision-making is quintessentially designed to do. This is not to suggest 
that there is no place for psychological studies to be admitted in evidence, but we should not 
pretend that using such evidence in trade mark cases is ever going to be easy, or comfortable. 
The point we are seeking to make, however, is that the difficulties of accommodating 
psychological evidence in infringement cases is not an excuse for us failing to ask whether 
there is something that trade mark law can learn from psychology at a higher level of 
abstraction. Trade mark law turns in large part on how consumers process information and it 
is surely important that we at least explore whether our models of consumer processing could 
be made more accurate. With this in mind we have been part of a research team that has 
tried to do some proof of concept work に work that shows that psychology can help us 
question in a productive fashion whether our current assumptions about consumers are well-
founded. At the same time, our work adds to growing calls for trade mark law to be clearer 
about when other policy goals may cause us to discount some degree of confusion. If trade 
mark law had a better-grounded model of consumer reaction and a more clearly articulated 
set of policy goals, we might be able to remedy at least some of what is wrong with current 
trade mark systems.  
 
